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1. Introduction 
The U.S. dairy industry has been subjected to more government intervention and regula-
tion than almost any other domestic industry. There are three major areas of this market 
intervention: the dairy price support program; import quotas on dairy products; and Fed-
eral milk marketing orders (FMMOs). For several decades, these three policy instruments 
were closely connected and operated jointly to establish farm, wholesale, and retail prices 
for milk and manufactured products. But over the past two decades, price supports have 
become essentially irrelevant to market outcomes in the dairy industry and trade policy 
has been renegotiated in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trades and 
Tariffs (Cox, Coleman, Chavas, and Zhu 2005). On the other hand, the Federal Agricul-
ture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 mandated reforms to the FMMO program. 
These reforms include changing the way that minimum prices paid to farmers are deter-
mined and reducing the number of FMMOs through consolidation from 42 to no less than 
10 and more than 14 by January 2000. The period 1997–1999 was a significant transition 
period for these reforms, and so far the effects of these reforms on the consumers of dairy 
products have not yet been analyzed thoroughly. 
To better understand the distributional effects on consumers due to the FMMO pro-
gram during this period, this paper investigates an econometric model of the retail de-
mand for 14 dairy products. The model analyzes weekly city–level purchases of dairy 
products matched with demographic characteristics of the purchasing households in 22 
cities across the U.S. during the transition period 1997–1999 of the FMMO program. The   2
model is flexible with respect to estimated price and income effects, and satisfies the 
conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a rational, representative 
consumer in each city. 
There are four important gains that can be expected from the approach taken in this 
paper. First, a higher level of disaggregation of products included in the empirical model 
increases the degree of substitution across goods. For example, whole milk, 2%, 1%, and 
nonfat beverage milk should be close substitutes. Indeed, if the price of 2% milk is higher 
than the average of the prices of whole and nonfat milk, then mixing two half gallons of 
each of the latter types would give approximately 1.9% milk at a lower cost than a gallon 
of 2% milk. A similar argument applies to the price of 1% milk relative to the average 
price of 2% and nonfat milk. Thus, we expect ex ante that the estimated own–price elas-
ticities of demand will increase in the empirical model, and this is precisely what we find 
relative to the extant literature.  
Second, nonlinear three–stage least squares estimation methods are used to account 
for simultaneous determination of prices and quantities. This also should increase the 
point estimates for the own–price elasticities of demand, and improve the bias, consis-
tency, and precision of those estimates. 
Third, the model chosen for the empirical analysis is associated with a null hypothesis 
of zero for each price and income elasticity, which is the appropriate null in a valid statis-
tical analysis. This contrasts to a null hypothesis of negative unity for the own–price elas-
ticity and positive unity for the income elasticity in the Almost Ideal Demand System. 
Thus, we expect the inferences drawn from the model specification employed in this pa-  3
per to be less biased and inconsistent. 
Fourth, the functional form for the dependent and independent variables, i.e., linear in 
quantities, prices, and income, rather than budget shares as dependent variables with the 
natural logarithms of prices and income on the right–hand side of the demand equations 
generates a demand model with a much larger region of economic regularity (LaFrance, 
Beatty, and Pope 2005). Thus, ex ante, the empirical model can be expected to be more 
useful for welfare and other economic analyses than alternative functional forms. 
To set the stage for this analysis, a brief history of the evolution of domestic Federal 
policy in the dairy industry is presented next. This is followed by a description of the 
model and its properties, a description of the data and its use in the empirical model, the 
estimation techniques and results, a simulation analysis of the welfare effects of FMMOs 
during this period, and our summary and conclusions. 
2. A Brief History of Federal Domestic Dairy Policy 
The origins of Federal dairy policy can be traced to the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 
1933 and 1935 as part of the New Deal in the Great Depression. Permanent authorization 
for the dairy price support program is the Agricultural Act of 1949, which is the last per-
manent farm bill. The FMMO program is authorized by the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937. With high support prices relative to world prices up until the mid 
to late 1990’s, import quotas have been used to prevent imports of dairy products from 
overwhelming the price support program. This section reviews the history and evolution 
of domestic policy in the U.S. dairy industry.   4
The Dairy Price Support Program 
The Agricultural Act of 1949 specifies that farm milk prices are to be supported at be-
tween 75 and 90 percent of parity and authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to deter-
mine the specific price support level within this range. Parity is defined by the index of 
prices paid by farmers for commodities and services, interest, taxes, and wages relative to 
the base period 1910–14. For example, this index reached 2,244 in January 2008 and the 
parity price equivalent for manufacturing grade milk was $40.40 per hundred pounds 
(cwt) of farm milk (NASS, USDA, Agricultural Prices, January 2008), while the parity 
price for all milk was $43.76/cwt in January 2008 and $47.10/cwt in April 2008 (NASS, 
USDA, Agricultural Prices, April 2008). 
Farm milk prices are supported indirectly through government purchases of butter, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk from the processors of these products by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC). The purchase prices for these products are pre–announced and 
determined by formulas that include a manufacturing “make margin” intended to cover 
the cost of a processing plant of average efficiency to convert milk into these products 
and an estimated “yield factor” for each product that converts a cwt of milk into a pound 
of butter, cheese, or nonfat dry milk. The objective of these administratively determined 
CCC purchase prices is to achieve a farm–level price received for manufacturing milk at 
least equal to the support price. 
Before 1977, support prices were set once a year and were effective throughout the 
marketing year. But the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 required midyear adjustments 
in the support price and added the prices of land and fixed inputs to the calculations for   5
support prices, dramatically increasing milk support prices twice a year during this period 
of rapid commodity price inflation. As a result, large surpluses of dairy products devel-
oped (LaFrance and de Gorter 1985), and the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 broke 
away from parity pricing altogether, setting the manufacturing milk support price nomi-
nally at $13.10/cwt. As a result of continuing surpluses, the 1983 Dairy and Tobacco Ad-
justment Act lowered the support price again to $12.60/cwt and allowed for additional 
reductions if net government removals of manufactured dairy products remained high.  
These reductions in the nominal support price for farm milk continued throughout the 
1980s. The Food Security Act of 1985 set the support price at $11.60/cwt for the 1986 
calendar year, $11.35 for January–September, 1987, and $11.10/cwt through the end of 
1989. On January 1, 1990, the support price was reduced further to $10.10/cwt because 
CCC purchases of manufactured dairy products were projected to exceed 5 billion pounds 
in terms of farm milk equivalent weight. The support price for manufacturing milk has 
been quite steady since this date, fluctuating slightly between $10.35 and $9.90/cwt, and 
current legislation continues the support price at the latter level through 2012. 
Since 1990, the farm milk support price has been set low enough that it seldom af-
fects the market prices received for manufacturing grade milk. Thus, during the transition 
period of 1997–1999 for the FMMO program, the price support program had little to no 
impact on farm, wholesale, or retail prices for milk and dairy products. However, al-
though the 1949 Agricultural Act has been suspended by omnibus farm bill amendments 
since 1972, it remains the last piece of permanent farm legislation. In the event that an 
expiring farm bill is not extended or replaced by a new one, Federal policies in the dairy   6
industry will revert to the 1949 regulations, with the attendant disrupting impacts on both 
demand and supply that would result from a more than fourfold increase in the farm price 
for manufacturing grade milk. Nevertheless, given the evolution of the dairy price sup-
port program, we can safely ignore it in our analysis of the distributional impacts on con-
sumers of the FMMO program. 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
FMMOs divide the country into geographic regions. First handlers of milk (manufactur-
ers or processors) in each region are required to pay to farmers at least the minimum price 
for four classes of milk defined by the Federal government.
1 Class I is the milk used for 
fluid beverage products.
2 Class II milk is used to produce soft dairy products such as ice 
cream, cottage cheese, and yogurt. Class III milk goes into hard dairy products such as 
butter and cheese. Class III–A milk is used to manufacture nonfat dry milk. The original 
objectives of milk marketing orders focused on equalizing the market power of buyers 
and sellers, and to provide market stability. In reality, these marketing orders allow the 
Federal government, acting for milk producers, to price discriminate.  
FMMOs set minimum prices that must be paid by processors to dairy farmers or their 
                                                 
 
1 Berck and Perloff (1985) present a theory of how marketing order prices are set and how they affect milk 
prices.  
2 Only Grade A milk may be used for the Class I market. When milk marketing orders were introduced in 
the 1930s, one of the justifications was to reduce the variability in the availability of Grade A milk. Today 
nearly all milk produced in the U. S. meets the Grade A standards, so this rationale is outdated.   7
cooperatives for Grade A milk. Grade A milk meets the sanitary requirements to be le-
gally sold as a fluid product. Markets where FMMOs are in place are those where the 
producers of  2
3 of the milk marketed in a given demand area or  2
3 of the number of 
producers that market milk in that area have elected to come under a Federal order. 
Only Grade A milk is regulated under FMMOs. Over 85 percent of all milk currently 
produced in the United States is Grade A. FMMOs regulate over 80 percent of the Grade 
A milk produced in the United States. The USDA (1984) estimates that virtually all 
Grade B milk (milk that can only be used to make manufactured dairy products) pro-
duced in the U.S. would qualify as Grade A if a market existed for the additional fluid 
grade milk. State milk marketing orders that mimic the FMMO program control virtually 
all remaining Grade A milk produced in the country. 
Two major provisions of FMMOs are classified pricing according to use and the 
pooling of revenue from the sale of milk to obtain a single blend price to be paid to dairy 
farmers. Milk used for fluid products is Class I. Milk used for soft manufactured products 
(ice cream, cottage cheese, and yogurt) is Class II. Milk used for hard manufactured 
products (butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, and canned milk) is Class III.
3  
                                                 
 
3 In 22 of the 34 FMMOs in operation during 1997–1999, a fourth class, Class III–A, for nonfat dry milk 
also was in effect. The minimum price for Class III–A milk was based on a formula that used the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) price for nonfat dry milk minus a make margin intended to reflect the cost of 
production at an average efficiency processing plant, with the difference multiplied by a yield factor that is 
 
   8
FMMOs set minimum prices based on specified relationships to the price of Grade B 
milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin, where more than a third of the Grade B milk in the 
U.S. is produced. The average price paid for Grade B milk obtained from a monthly sur-
vey of 100 processing plants in Wisconsin and 62 plants in Minnesota that produce but-
ter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk is used to calculate the Minnesota–Wisconsin price, or 
the Base Month Price (BMP). These plants purchase approximately 80 percent of the 
Grade B milk sold in these two states.  
The price of Grade B milk is presumed to be a competitive price because manufactur-
ing grade milk is not directly regulated by Federal or state milk marketing orders.
4 The 
Basic Formula Price (BFP) was used to determine the minimum prices for all classes of 
milk in all FMMOs until the end of October, 1999.
5 The BFP is calculated by adjusting 
the previous month’s BMP to 3.5% butterfat content using a dairy product price formula. 
The formula uses information contained in reports by the National Agricultural Statistics 
                                                 
 
intended to represent the average yield in pounds of nonfat milk solids from a hundred pounds of milk. This 
class became Class IV in all FMMOs on January 1, 2000, as part of the final order for the milk marketing 
order reforms. Both butter and nonfat dry milk are included in the new Class IV. We do not include nonfat 
dry milk in our analysis and our sample period is 1997–1999. Hence, we focus only on Classes I, II, and III. 
4 However, as discussed above, the Federal dairy price support program provided a floor on the price of 
Grade B milk from 1949 until 1990, though this was not a binding price floor during 1997–1999. 
5 From the early 1960s until June 1, 1995, the Minnesota–Wisconsin price was the BPF for all milk market-
ing orders (ERS, USDA, 1996). Federal milk order reform replaced the BFP with a dairy products compo-
nents based formula beginning on November 1, 1999.   9
Service (NASS) on CME and National Cheese Exchange (NCE) prices for grade AA or 
A butter (CME), 40–pound blocks of Cheddar cheese (CME or NCE), nonfat dry milk 
(CME), and dried whey (CME), yield factors for each of these products, and a weighted 
average of American cheese and nonfat dry milk production in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
The NASS central market exchange prices are published weekly by the USDA Agricul-
tural Marketing Service in Dairy Market News. During the period 1997–1999, the yield 
factors used in the FMMO calculations are: butter, 4.27 lbs/cwt; Cheddar cheese, 9.87 
lbs/cwt; dry buttermilk, 0.42 lbs/cwt; nonfat dry milk, 8.07 lbs/cwt; and whey cream but-
ter, 0.238 lbs/cwt.  
The formulas for calculating the component values of farm milk in the production of 




Cheese Value Cheese Yield Factor NASS Cheese Price
Whey Cream Butter Yield Factor NASS Butter Price
Butter Value Butter Yield Factor NASS Butter Price
Nonfat Dry Milk Yield Factor NASS NFDM Price





+× . ASS Buttermilk Powder Price
 (1) 
These formulas are used to update the previous month’s BMP obtained from the NASS 
survey of Minnesota and Wisconsin processing plants to the current month’s BFP. This is 
then used as the basic policy price for all minimum prices for all classes of milk in the 
                                                 
 
6 The formula for the nonfat dry milk value of farm milk is the same as that for butter.   10
FMMOs. However, while they differ from month–to–month, on average over a marketing 
year the BMP and BFP are quite similar. 
During the period 1997–1999, the minimum Class III price in all FMMOs was equal 
to the BFP, the minimum Class II price was the BFP from two months previous plus a 
$0.30/cwt differential, and the average minimum Class I price was the BFP plus a 
$2.60/cwt differential. The time paths of these minimum class prices over the entire sam-
ple period are presented in Figure 1. These price policies produced an average farm–level 
price of Class I milk equal to $15.58/cwt, Class II milk of $13.04, Class III milk of 
$12.91, farm–level FMMO blend price of $14.04/cwt, in comparison to an average dairy 
support price of $10.05/cwt. 
3. The Economic Model 
We assume that city–level weekly average purchases of dairy products can be modeled 
with a representative consumer. We use a generalized Almost Ideal Demand System that 
is linear and quadratic in prices and linear in income (LQ–IDS), is flexible with respect to 
price and income effects, and satisfies the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for 
the existence of a rational, representative consumer (LaFrance 2004). The demand equa-
tions for the LQ–IDS can be written in matrix form as 
  ( ) ½ m ′ ′′ =+ + + − − − qA s B p p p A s p B p αγ α , (2) 
where q is the vector of quantities demanded, α and γ are vectors of parameters, A is a 
matrix of parameters,  ′ = BB  is a symmetric matrix of parameters, p is the vector of 
normalized final consumer prices for dairy products, m is normalized income, and s is a 
vector of demographic variables. All prices and income are normalized by a positive–  11
valued, increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous function of the prices of all other 
goods.
7 
To identify and predict the impacts of dairy product prices on consumer welfare, 
we need to compare the utility level at the initial prices to the utility level at the final 
prices. Suppose that dairy product prices change from p0 to p1. The equivalent variation, 
ev, is the change in income at the original price vector, p0, that is just necessary to bring 
the consumer to the new utility level at the final price vector, p1. For the demand model 
in equation (2), the equivalent variation for such a price change is 
  () ( )
01 ()
11 1 1 00 0 0 ½½ ev m e m
− ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ =− − − −− − −
pp p p As p Bp p p As p Bp
γ αα . (3) 
For this model, the compensating variation is proportional to the equivalent variation, 
10 () cv ev e
− ′ =×
pp γ . Hence, we focus only on the equivalent variation. 
To better understand the distributional effects of FMMOs, note that the marginal 
effect of a change in the k
th demographic variable on the equivalent variation for the 
change in dairy product prices from p0 to p1 is 











∂ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ ∂ ∑
pp γ . (4) 
                                                 
 
7 This model can be thought of either as an incomplete demand system (LaFrance and Hanemann 1989) or 
as a complete system in which the demand for the n+1
st good, x, has a different functional form than the 
demands for q, i.e.,  ( ) (1 ) (1 ½ ) . xm ′′ ′ ′ ′ =− − − −− p p pA s p pB p γα γ  In either case, it does not produce a 
separable subset of demand equations for dairy products.   12
This depends on the coefficients on the variables sk in the demands for dairy products, the 
size of the relative prices changes, and the vector of income coefficients. Therefore, we 
expect a priori that the welfare effects of marketing orders for dairy products vary sys-
tematically across consumer characteristics. This is precisely what we find in the empiri-
cal work reported below. 
4. Data and Variable Definitions 
Consumer prices and quantities are obtained from individual scanner data. These prices 
are adjusted for the effects of retail sales taxes by calculating real, after–tax prices facing 
consumers. We use robust nonlinear three stage least squares estimation to account for 
the joint determination of city–level quantities and prices. We carefully select instruments 
to obtain a best estimator in this class. We also include several weekly city–level demo-
graphic variables to avoid the problem with scanner data due to omitted variables bias: 
ethnicity; home ownership; employment status; occupation; ages and numbers of children 
in the household; education and ages of household heads; and income.  
The quantity data are city–level weekly average household purchases of fourteen 
dairy products calculated from weekly Information Resources Incorporated’s (IRI) Info-
scan™ scanner data for the three–year period January 1, 1997 through December 30, 
1999 for 23 U.S. cities.
8 The city populations range from 50,000 to 10 million. Each re-
                                                 
 
8 Atlanta, Boston, Cedar Rapids (IA), Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Eau Claire (WI), Grand Junction (CO), 
 
   13
gion of the country is represented with several cities. IRI records both purchase price and 
quantity information at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level for a panel of customers 
for a number of grocery stores in each city. We group the UPC code data into 14 prod-
ucts: non–fat milk, 1% milk, 2% milk, whole milk, dairy cream including half and half, 
coffee creamers, butter and margarine, ice cream including frozen yogurt and ice milk, 
cooking yogurt (plain and vanilla yogurt), flavored yogurt (all other yogurt that is not 
categorized as cooking yogurt), cream cheese, shredded and grated cheese, American and 
other processed cheese, and natural cheese. The dependent variable in the demand system 
is the average quantity purchased per household in each city in each week for each of the 
fourteen dairy products. 
The consumer prices of dairy products are city–level weekly average prices. Given a 
generic city, the j
th product category, and the t
th week, define the city’s average price for 
product j in week t by 
  ( ) 1 1 , 1,...,14
j j
jj j j j
n n
jt i t i k k i pp q q j = = == Σ ∑ , (5) 
where nj is the number of unique UPC codes for that dairy product,  , 1,...,
j ij j qi n = , is the 
average quantity purchased per household per week in the given city of the dairy product 
                                                 
 
Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Memphis, Midland (TX), Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, Philadel-
phia, Pittsburgh, Pittsfield (MA), San Francisco/Oakland, Seattle/Tacoma, St. Louis, Tampa/St. Petersburg, 
and Visalia (CA).   14
with UPC code ij,
9 and
j it p  is the retail price of that good in week t. To reflect the effects 
of sales taxes and inflation, we adjusted the reported prices in two ways. We first multi-
plied each price by one plus the state–level retail sales tax on food items to account for 
the effects of sales taxes on the final retail prices paid by consumers. We then deflated by 
the regional consumer price index for all items except food for all urban consumers, not 
seasonally adjusted (the nonfood CPI). The nonfood CPI was multiplied by one plus the 
general retail sales tax rate in the state where the city is located.
10 
We match each household’s price and quantity data with household–level weekly 
measures of several demographic variables. The first is the household’s annual income 
bracket. There are eight income brackets with midpoints from $7,500 to $200,000.
11 We 
constructed an estimate of the city–level average weekly household income by taking the 
                                                 
 
9 The average quantity weights are calculated over all 156 weeks in the sample period. 
10 If the general ad valorem retail sales tax rate in the state is τ, then the after–tax nonfood CPI is (1+τ)CPI. 
Retail sales tax rates are taken from the Council of State Governments (1997–1999) and the regional non-
food CPI’s are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1997–1999), with 1982 as the base year. We linearly 
interpolated monthly nonfood CPI data to obtain weekly series. We matched each IRI city to one of four 
CPI regions: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. 
11 The last category is top coded as income at or above $100,000 per year. We arbitrarily set $200,000 as 
the conditional mean of the top income category. This amount is roughly the mean income level of all U.S. 
households that earned at least $100,000 per year in the years 1997–1999. We calculated this national aver-
age conditional mean income using the full household income samples in the March supplement of the 
Continuing Population Survey for each of these three years.   15
sum of the products of the proportion of households in each income bracket times the 
midpoint of that income bracket, using the number of households that purchased a given 
dairy product as a fraction of the number households that purchased at least one dairy 
product in that city during that week as weights. We deflated the city–level average 
household income with that city’s after–tax nonfood CPI. We divided these measures of 
deflated average annual household income by 52 to estimate the deflated average weekly 
income per household for each city and week in our sample. 
We constructed weekly city–level aggregate measures of several other demographic 
variables in a manner similar to the calculations for weekly average household income. If 
a household purchased any dairy product in a given week, then we included that house-
hold’s demographic characteristics to calculate the city–level aggregates, so that the 
demographic variables vary week–to–week and city–by–city as averages of dairy–
product purchasing households’ demographic characteristics. These demographic vari-
ables include ethnic group, home ownership, employment status, occupation, whether the 
household has children under 18, has young children (ages 0–5.9), has medium aged 
children (ages 6–11.9), or has older children (ages 12–17.9), the number of young, me-
dium, and older children in the household, number of individuals in each household, 
years of education of male and female heads of household, and ages of the heads of 
household. Table 1 presents summary statistics for weekly household income and the 
other demographic variables included in the model. Not shown in the table, but included 
in the empirical model, are city–level fixed effects. 
5. Model Estimates   16
We estimate the demand system by nonlinear three stage least squares (NL3SLS) to ac-
count for joint determination between quantities and prices (Deaton 1988). The instru-
ments used in the first stage price equations include city–level fixed effects, the demo-
graphic and income variables in the demand equations, the current and lagged deflated 
wholesale price of milk by city, the Herfindahl–Hirschman market power index (HHI) for 
grocery stores in the city, squared household income, squared wholesale milk price, 
squared HHI, and interactions between the race, home ownership, and income variables 
with the wholesale milk price and the HHI. These instruments produced coefficients of 
multiple determination ranging from 0.691 to 0.956 for the deflated average prices, indi-
cating a reasonably strong instrument set.
12  
In equation (2), each structural parameter enters each demand equation through the 
income term,  ½ m ′′ ′ −− − pp A s p B p α . In this expression, market prices interact with 
each parameter. Amemyia (1985) showed that best NL3SLS estimators are obtained if 
and only if the set of instrumental variables can be expressed as a linear combination of 
the expected values of the partial derivatives of the structural equations with respect to 
the structural parameters, conditional on the instrument set. To meet this requirement, we 
need a set of instrumental variables for each demand equation that includes a constant, 
city–level fixed effects dummies, demographic variables including average weekly 
                                                 
 
12 We also tried additional instruments, such as the market shares of each of the eight largest firms in each 
city and the squared market share variables, with similar results.    17
household income, predicted prices, own– and cross–product second–order interactions 
between predicted prices, and interactions between predicted prices and the city dummies 
and the demographic variables. Thus, we need 856 instruments for the 819 structural pa-
rameters with a total of 3588 cross–section/time–series observations per demand equation 
and 14 demand equations, for a total of 50,162 observations.  
We used White’s robust heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator in 
the NL3SLS system estimates to calculate robust, asymptotically consistent standard er-
rors. Table 2 presents summary statistics for each of the fourteen dependent variables and 
the models error variances and goodness of fit measures. As can be seen from this table, 
this demand model fits the available data reasonably well. 
Because we estimated the LQ–IDS demand model for the fourteen dairy products us-
ing a large number of demographic variables, it is impractical to report all of the coeffi-
cient estimates in a table, or series of tables.
13 Many coefficients on the demographic 
variables are statistically different from zero at a 5% significance level in some, but gen-
erally not all, equations. However, the demographic variables are collectively strongly 
statistically significant. Rather than try to describe the effects of all of the demographic 
variables on quantities demanded variable by variable, we turn to their effects on the 
price elasticities of demand and the distribution of the welfare effects due to marketing 
                                                 
 
13 A complete list of empirical results is available from the authors on request.   18
orders. 
As the prices of dairy products change, households that consume dairy products alter 
the mix of dairy products that they demand. Table 3 shows the own– and cross–price 
elasticities for dairy products calculated at the mean of all of the variables (from table 1). 
In each row, each cell shows the price elasticity for the product due to a change in the 
price listed at the top of the corresponding column. All of the own–price elasticities are 
negative, statistically significant, and with one exception – 1% milk – are inelastic. The 
magnitudes of the point estimates for the own–price elasticities are comparable to those 
reported in the previous literature, although for the reasons discussed in the introduction, 
are larger in absolute value. The own–price elasticities of demand for the four types of 
fresh milk (1%, 2%, non–fat, and whole) range from –0.628 for nonfat milk to –2.05 for 
1% milk.
14 The demands for other dairy products are less elastic, and the demand for but-
ter is the least elastic, with an estimated own–price elasticity of demand of –0.295. There 
are roughly equal numbers of positive and negative cross–price elasticities of demand. 
All of these are close to zero – generally below 0.15 in absolute value and none are larger 
than 0.3 in absolute value. Most cross–price elasticities of demand are not statistically 
different from zero at a 5% significance level.  
                                                 
 
14 Again, recall that mixing two half gallons of nonfat and 2% milk produces a gallon of 1% milk, so that 
this variety, in particular, has a ready substitute available in the market. Hence, one would expect it to have 
an elastic demand curve.   19
Table 4 reports the income elasticities, also evaluated at the sample means of the data. 
All of the income elasticities are negative, and eight are statistically different from zero at 
the 5% significance level. The estimated income elasticities fall generally in the range of 
other estimated income elasticities for dairy products
15. 
6. Distribution of the Consumer Welfare Effects of Eliminating FMMOs 
One important use of a carefully estimated demand system is the ability to conduct useful 
welfare analysis of government policies. We apply the results of estimating the model 
above to investigate the distributional effects on consumers from FMMOs. During the 
1990s, milk production was affected by 31 Federal marketing orders and 4 state orders, of 
which only the Virginia and California orders completely replace the Federal orders.  
Other studies have examined the effects on consumers of eliminating or changing 
milk marketing orders, although none of them have looked at the distributional effects 
across demographic and income groups. LaFrance and de Gorter (1985) find that raw 
milk prices would fall nearly 20% in the absence of marketing orders. A retail pass–
through of 100% implies that retail prices also would decrease 20% (LaFrance 1991, 
1993). Some estimate that eliminating the New England Dairy Compact, which acted 
                                                 
 
15 See Heien and Roheim Wessells (1990), Park, Holcomb, Raper and Capp (1996), Huang and Lin (2000), 
Gould, Cox and Perali (1990) and Bergtold, Akobudu and Petersen (2004). In a recent study of U.S. food 
demand over the 20
th century, LaFrance (2008) finds that the income elasticities of demand for many food 
items have decreased over time and that those for all five dairy products studied – milk, butter, cheese, ice 
cream and frozen yogurt, and other dairy products – turned negative in the mid–1990s.   20
much like a marketing order, would result in a 4% – 70% decrease in fresh milk prices 
(Cotterill 2003).  
LaFrance and de Gorter (1985) and Dardis and Bedore (1990) estimated that con-
sumer surplus losses due to marketing orders averaged nearly $700 million dollars annu-
ally in constant 1967 dollars (approximately $3.6 billion per year in constant 2000 dol-
lars) during the 1970s and the mid–1980s. Dardis and Bedore (1990) pointed out that the 
consumers with the lowest incomes are the hardest hit by this type of price discrimination 
policy. Heien (1977), Ippolito and Masson (1978) and Masson and Eisenstat (1980) find 
social costs involving milk marketing orders of $175 million, $25 million and $70 million 
per year, also in constant 1967 dollars. 
As discussed in Section 3 above, we expect a priori that the welfare effects of price 
changes will vary substantially across demographic characteristics. If marketing orders 
for dairy products were eliminated, consumers in some demographic groups may gain 
while others may lose. We use the empirical estimates of the demand model in (2) to ana-
lyze the differential welfare effects of this contrapositive policy question. We simulate 
the weekly equivalent variation per household – the change in weekly income that a 
household would be willing to accept in lieu of experiencing the price changes associated 
with eliminating the marketing order. Households benefit from the policy change if the 
equivalent variation is positive and suffer a loss when the equivalent variation is negative. 
To analyze the economic and distributional effects of FMMOs, we examine three 
cases taken from the literature. For FFMO policies in effect prior to the marketing order 
reforms of the FAIR Act, combining the farm–level results of LaFrance and de Gorter   21
(1985), –18% for fluid milk and +11% for manufacturing milk, with the farm–to–retail 
price elasticities of LaFrance (1993) – 1.0 for Fluid milk milk, 0.33 for butter, 0.16 for 
cheese, 0.00 for ice cream and frozen yogurt, and 0.14 for other dairy products – one pre-
dicts that on average fluid milk prices decrease –18%, butter prices increase 3%, cheese 
prices increase 2%, frozen dairy product prices remain unchanged, and all other dairy 
product prices increase 1%. More recently, Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and Kaiser (2001) pre-
dict that moving from FMMOs to competition would decrease farm–level fluid milk 
prices an average of 16% and increase farm–level manufacturing milk prices an average 
2.5%. Combining these estimates with the farm–to–retail price elasticities taken from 
LaFrance (1993) implies prices changes of –16% for fluid milk, +1% for butter, +0.4% 
for cheese, 0% for frozen dairy products, and +0.35% for all other dairy products. Cox 
and Chavas (2001) simulate regional retail price changes from eliminating the FMMOs 
and moving to a competitive market in their Scenario 2. This simulation predicts that av-
erage fluid milk prices decrease 15%, soft dairy product (yogurt, cottage cheese, and 
cream cheese) prices increase 0.6%, butter prices decrease 7.6%, cheese prices decrease 
between 0.1% (Italian cheese) to 0.5% (American processed cheese), frozen dairy prod-
uct prices (ice cream and frozen yogurt) prices decrease 2.2%, and other manufactured 
dairy product (nonfat dry milk, canned and condensed milk, dry whole milk, and dry 
whey) prices increase 1.9%.  
Although the predictions are nearly identical for the impacts of eliminating FMMOs 
on the retail prices of fluid milk, they differ in terms of the size and sign of the retail price 
effects for manufactured products. In an effort to bracket the consumer welfare effects,   22
we simulate three cases, with retail fluid milk prices falling by 20% in each case.
16 Table 
5 displays the results on the average quantities demanded for each of these cases. The 
first column simulates no change in the retail prices of any manufacturing dairy products, 
the second column simulates a 5% increase in the retail prices of all manufactured dairy 
products, and the third column uses the average increase or decrease in each manufac-
tured dairy product taken from the above three combined sources in the literature.  
Table 5 shows the simulated average quantities purchased (evaluated at the mean of 
the explanatory variables) for each of the scenarios. As expected, if fluid milk prices de-
crease and manufactured dairy product prices increase, quantities purchased of fresh milk 
products rise and those for processed dairy products fall. In all simulations, the quantity 
purchased of 1%, 2%, non–fat, and whole milk increase substantially. In the scenarios 
where some or all processed prices rise, the corresponding quantities purchased of these 
products fall by comparatively modest amounts.  
Given the estimated changes in the quantities purchased of fresh fluid milk and proc-
essed dairy products in the scenarios when all dairy prices change, we expect some dairy 
consumers to benefit and others to lose. Table 6 presents the simulated welfare effects 
across several demographic groups by holding all but one demographic variable fixed at 
                                                 
 
16 Other simulation experiments showed that smaller or larger cuts in the retail prices of milk fluid beverage 
products have proportional effects. For example, a 10% cut in fluid milk prices has almost exactly half as 
large an ev effect as a 20% decrease.    23
the sample means and changing one characteristic at a time. The first column of this table 
presents the obvious result that if the retail prices of processed dairy products do not 
change, then all consumers benefit from a drop in fresh milk prices. Moving down the 
rows in this column reveals that, as one would expect, these economic gains vary consid-
erably across different types of households. The second column shows that if the prices 
of all manufactured dairy products increase by 5%, then the economic gains to each 
demographic group decrease, with wealthy households and childless couples (yuppies) 
losing. The third column shows that if prices of processed dairy products change by the 
average predictions gleaned from the literature, then all but the wealthiest of consumers 
would gain from eliminating the Federal milk marketing order program, and in most 
cases by considerably more than is predicted for the simulation in which retail prices for 
manufactured products do not change as a result of moving from FMMOs to a free mar-
ket for dairy products.  
The first row of table 6 shows the equivalent variation for a family with average 
demographic characteristics. Given that the price of fresh milk falls 20%, such a typical 
household’s weekly equivalent variation is $1.44 if the prices of processed goods do not 
change, 63¢ if they rise by 5%, and $2.94 if they change by the average prediction in the 
literature. The second row of table 6 shows the equivalent variation for a White house-
hold. The third row shows the equivalent variation for a comparable Nonwhite family, 
which is simulated by setting the variable for White equal to zero and the variables for 
Black, Asian, and Hispanic equal to the proportion of the sample of each of these Non-
white groups divided by the fraction of all households that are not White. For example,   24
the simulated equivalent variation for a Nonwhite family (the third row) is 96¢/week for a 
0% price change in processed goods. The corresponding equivalent variations for a White 
family (the second row) is $1.50. Nonwhite families always benefit less than White fami-
lies in all of the simulations. 
The above result that the welfare effects of changes in dairy product prices vary with 
the race of the household may be due to varying incidences of lactose intolerance. In the 
United States, the prevalence of lactose intolerance are relatively low for whites: 5% for 
Caucasians of northern European and Scandinavian descent (although 70% for North 
American Jews), 45% for African American children and 79% for African American 
adults, 55% for Mexican American males, to 90% for Asian Americans, and 98% for 
Southeast Asians (Nutrigenomics 2005). 
Table 6 also shows how welfare changes as we vary one variable at a time for in-
come, education, presence of children, and whether the household has a child in each age 
group. In all of the simulations, lower income families benefit more than wealthier fami-
lies from eliminating FMMOs. Similarly, more educated families fare better than less 
educated ones. Families with children under six years of age or with older children be-
tween 12 and 18 years of age benefit more than others from eliminating marketing orders. 
Perhaps the most striking experiments are those in the last two rows of table 6, where 
we compare the equivalent variations of two types of families by varying several charac-
teristics at once. In the next to last row, we examine a family with three small children. 
The parents are 35 years old, they have a deflated income of $20,000, the wife is not em-
ployed, the husband works in a non–professional occupation, they have three children   25
under the age of six, and they rent their dwelling. In contrast, in the last row, is a childless 
couple. They are 30 years old, have a higher income of $60,000, are working profession-
als, and own their dwelling. The family with three children gains more from eliminating 
FMMOs than virtually any other group, presumably because their children consume rela-
tively large amounts of fresh milk. In contrast, the childless, wealthier couple only bene-
fits if the increase in processed dairy product prices is less than 5%. Moreover, even if 
there is no increase in the retail prices for manufactured dairy products, the benefit to the 
young family with three children is 82% greater than that for the childless couple. In gen-
eral, if the 20% drop in the fresh milk price is offset by a 0% or 5% increase in the proc-
essed products prices, nearly all consumer groups benefit, with the exception of the 
wealthiest members of the population. 
Finally, our simulations show that FMMO regulations are highly regressive. We de-
fine the regulatory burden of the FMMO program as a household’s annual equivalent 
variation from removing the marketing order divided by its annual income. We look at 
the regulatory burden associated with a 20% decrease in fluid milk prices and a 5% in-
crease in manufacturing prices. Figure 2 compares the regulatory burden as a function of 
income for white and for non–white families.
17 The equivalent variation of removing the 
marketing order is positive at low incomes – consumers benefit from removing it – so 
                                                 
 
17 Simulations for the other two scenarios have the same regressive structure.   26
there is a regulatory burden (loss) from imposing marketing orders for milk. For white 
families, the burden falls from 0.61% at an income of $7,500, to 0.44% at $10,000, 
0.19% at $20,000, 0.11% at $30,000, 0.04% at $50,000, 0.01% at $75,000. At higher in-
comes, the burden is slightly negative, ranging from –0.002% at $85,000 to –0.04 at 
$200,000.  
The curve for Nonwhite families lies strictly below that for White families, although 
both curves fall with income. At $7,500, the regulatory burden of a Nonwhite family is 
about half that of a White family. At the average real income, $25,000, the regulatory 
burden is about a third for the Nonwhite family as for a white one. Perhaps this difference 
has to do with higher rates of lactose intolerance among Nonwhites. 
7. Conclusions 
We presented and estimated a dairy demand system for households that consume dairy 
products, using an exactly aggregable, theoretically consistent demand model, scanner 
data, and matching household–level demographic variables. We estimated this model us-
ing nonlinear three stage least squares to account for the possibility of measurement er-
rors and simultaneous equations bias, and calculated robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form. We then used the empirical results of this model 
to simulate the welfare effects of eliminating Federal milk marketing orders for various 
demographic groups.  
There are substantial differences across demographic groups in welfare effects from 
eliminating market orders. Virtually all consumers benefit from eliminating milk market-
ing orders, except for the wealthiest members of the population. Poorer families with   27
young children gain more from eliminating this policy–induced price discrimination than 
richer families with no children or older children. That is, as predicted, orphans and 
young families with small children suffer from milk marketing orders while childless 
yuppies benefit. Finally, marketing orders are a highly regressive policy tool. Households 
with lower income levels pay a larger percentage of their incomes as a result of the milk 
marketing order regulations than do those with higher income levels.   28
References 
Amemyia, T. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Berck, P., and J.M. Perloff. 1985. “A Dynamic Analysis of Marketing Orders, Voting, 
and Welfare.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 487–96. 
Bergtold, J., E. Akobundu, and E.B. Peterson. 2004. “The FAST Method: Estimating Un-
conditional Demand Elasticities for Processed Foods in the Presence of Fixed Ef-
fects.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 29: 276–95. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1997–1999. “Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers, 
All Products Less Food.” 
Council of State Governments. 1997–1999. “Food and Drug Sales Tax Exemptions.” The 
Book of the States 31–33. 
Cotterill, R.W. 2003. “The Impact of the Northeastern Dairy Compact on New England 
Consumers: A Report from the Milk Policy Wars.”  Food Marketing Policy Center 
Research Report 77. 
Cox, T.L., Coleman, J.R., Chavas, J.–P., and Y. Zhu. “An economic Analysis of the Ef-
fects on the World Dairy Sector of Extending Uruguay Round Agreement to 2005.” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 47: 169-183. 
Cox, T.L. and J.–P. Chavas. 2001. “An Interregional Analysis of Price discrimination and 
Domestic Policy Reform in the U.S. Dairy Industry.” American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 83: 89-106. 
Dardis, R., and B. Bedore. 1990. “Consumer and Welfare Losses from Milk Marketing 
Orders.” Journal of Consumer Affairs 24:366–80.   29
Deaton, A. 1988. “Quality, Quantity, and Spatial Variation of Price.” American Eco-
nomic Review 87:418–430. 
Dobson, W.D. and R.A. Cropp. 1995. “Economic Impacts of the GATT Agreement on 
the U.S. Dairy Industry.” Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper Series, Paper No. 50, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin–Madison. 
Gould, B.W., T.L. Cox and F. Perali. 1990. “The Demand for Fluid Milk Products in the 
U.S.: A Demand Systems Approach.” Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 
15:1–12. 
Heien, D.M. 1977. “The Cost of the U. S. Dairy Price Support Program: 1949–74.” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 59(1):1–8. 
Heien, D.M., and C. Roheim Wessells. 1990. “Demand Systems Estimation with Micro-
data: A Censored Regression Approach.” Journal of Business and Economic Statis-
tics 8:365–71. 
Huang, K.S., and B. Lin. 2000. “Estimation of Food Demand and Nutrient Elasticities 
from Household Survey Data.” Tech. Bull. No. 1887, USDA, Economic Research 
Service, Washington DC, August.  
Ippolito, R.A. and R.T. Masson. 1978. “The Social Cost of Government Regulation of 
Milk.” Journal of Law and Economics, 21(1):33–65. 
Kawaguchi, T. Suzuki, N. and H.M. Kaiser. 2001. “Evaluating Class I Differentials in the 
New Federal Milk Marketing Order System.” Agribusiness 17: 527–538. 
LaFrance, J.T. 1991. “Consumer’s Surplus versus Compensating Variation Revisited.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73: 1496–1507.    30
LaFrance, J.T. 1993. “Weak Separability in Applied Welfare Analysis.” American Jour-
nal of Agricultural Economics 75: 770–775.  
  . 2004. “Integrability of the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System.” 
Economics Letters 84: 297–303.  
  . 2008. “The Structure of U.S. Food Demand.” Journal of Econometrics 147: 
336–349. 
LaFrance, J.T., T.K.M. Beatty, and R.D. Pope. 2005. “Building Gorman’s Nest.” 9
th 
World Congress of the Econometrics Society, London, United Kingdom. 
LaFrance, J.T., and H. de Gorter. 1985. “Regulation in a Dynamic Market: The U.S. 
Dairy Industry.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67: 821–32. 
Masson, R.T., and P.M. Eisenstat. 1980. “Welfare Impacts of Milk Orders and the Anti-
trust Immunities for Cooperatives.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
62:270–78. 
Nutrigenomics.ucdavis.edu/lactoseintolerance.htm. 2005. 
Park, J.L., R.B. Holcomb, K.C. Raper, and O. Capps, Jr. 1996. “A Demand System 
Analysis of Food Commodities by U.S. Households Segmented by Income.” Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:290–300.   31




Household size  2.816  0.176 
Weekly income  471.839  84.690 
Own house  0.826  0.074 
Race/ethnicity    
Share white  0.880  0.110 
Share black  0.054  0.075 
Share hispanic  0.045  0.063 
Share asian  0.014  0.032 
Male head of household     
Age 54.200  2.080 
Years of education  12.900  0.492 
Share unemployed  0.030  0.012 
Share employed part time   0.037  0.010 
Share employed full time  0.650  0.051 
Share nonprofessional occupation  0.356  0.113 
Share technical education  0.110  0.058 
Female head of household     
Age  53.551 2.124 
Years of education  13.373  0.398 
Share unemployed  0.226  0.046 
Share employed part time  0.170  0.035 
Share employed full time  0.366  0.051 
Share nonprofessional occupation  0.430  0.076 
Share technical education  0.068  0.039 
Children    
Children present in hh  0.350  0.058 
Average number of young children ages 0–5.9  0.133  0.041 
Average number of middle children ages 6–11.9  0.249  0.050 
Average number of older children ages 12–18  0.307  0.064 
Share of hh with children with young children   0.309  0.059 
Share of hh with children with middle children  0.524  0.039 
Share of hh with children with older children  0.562  0.060   32
Table 2. equation Summary Statistics 











1% Milk  151.409  77.692  3553.0  .41 
2% Milk  137.592  24.049  107.7  .81 
Nonfat Milk  127.630  25.798  101.8  .85 
Whole Milk  121.439  27.128  169.4  .77 
Fresh Cream  15.298  3.080  3.9  .59 
Coffee Additives  30.249  5.194  12.6  .53 
Natural Cheese  13.417  2.418  2.2  .63 
Processed Cheese  15.780  2.2551  2.1  .68 
Shredded Cheese  11.834  1.759  1.1  .64 
Cream Cheese  11.405  1.641  1.9  .30 
Butter 18.302  3.929  11.0  .29 
Ice Cream  79.484  12.936  90.1  .46 
Cooking Yogurt  22.060  5.937  25.9  .26 
Other Yogurt  33.882  4.480  9.7  .52 
 
Notes: “Cooking yogurt” is defined as plain and vanilla yogurt. “Other yogurt” is yogurt 
of all other flavors. 
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1% Milk  –2.052*  0.019  0.110*  0.168*  –0.038  –0.046*  0.051 0.016 –0.043 0.011 0.095 0.016 –0.113*  0.011 
2% Milk   0.018  –0.742*  0.079*  0.022  –0.050*  –0.045 0.163* 0.105* 0.025  –0.013 0.032* –0.098*  0.045  –0.031 
Nonfat Milk   0.115*  0.084*  –0.628*  –0.022  0.089*  0.091* –0.048 –0.098*  0.008  –0.013 –0.062*  –0.023  0.211* 0.000 
Whole Milk  0.181*  0.025  –0.022  –0.652*  –0.036  –0.072* –0.222* –0.098* –0.047  0.006  0.001 0.023 –0.069 0.030 
Fresh Cream  –0.063  –0.084*  0.139*  –0.056  –0.407*  0.022 0.101 0.274*  0.118* 0.173*  0.004 –0.016  –0.139 0.035 
Coffee Additive  –0.071*  –0.070  0.130*  –0.103*  0.020  –0.496*  –0.014  0.007 –0.056 –0.082*  –0.016 0.137* 0.019  0.144* 
Natural Cheese  0.042  0.140*  –0.039  –0.176* 0.052  –0.007  –0.641* 0.132*  0.040  –0.015 0.014 0.104 –0.035 0.052 
Process Cheese  0.013  0.094*  –0.083*  –0.082*  0.147*  0.004 0.137*  –0.734*  –0.009 –0.122*  –0.019 0.275  0.057  –0.028 
Shredded 
Cheese  –0.038 0.020  0.006  –0.038  0.060*  –0.031 0.039  –0.008 –0.404* –0.082*  0.022 0.036 0.068  0.044 
Cream Cheese  0.014  –0.019  –0.018  0.006  0.149*  –0.076*  –0.026 –0.194*  –0.138* –0.515*  0.064* 0.128* –0.225* –0.012 
Butter 0.093  0.033*  –0.056*  0.001  0.003  –0.009  0.019 –0.019  0.029  0.045*  –0.295* 0.136*  0.047  –0.038* 
Ice Cream  0.010  –0.062*  –0.013  0.013  –0.006  0.058*  0.077 0.196*  0.028  0.057*  0.087* –0.741*  0.187*  0.090* 
Yogurt Cooking  –0.196*  0.079  0.348*  –0.111  –0.147  0.023 –0.071  0.113 0.142* –0.276*  0.084 0.520*  –0.911*  –0.070 
Yogurt Flavored  0.011  –0.035  –0.001  0.029  0.023  0.103* 0.066  –0.034 0.057  –0.009 –0.044*  0.154*  –0.044 –0.808* 
 
Notes: The table shows the price elasticity given that the price of the good shown in the column changes. An asterisk denotes that we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
elasticity is zero at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 4. Income Elasticities for Households that Consume Dairy Products 
 
Dairy Product  Income Elasticity  Standard Error 
1% Milk  –0.558  0.468 
2% Milk  –0.221*  0.058 
Nonfat Milk  –0.239*  0.059 
Whole Milk  –0.484*  0.075 
Fresh Cream  –0.205*  0.098 
Coffee Additives  –0.071  0.087 
Natural Cheese  –0.209*  0.077 
Processed Cheese  –0.040  0.066 
Shredded Cheese  –0.115  0.068 
Cream Cheese  –0.109  0.091 
Butter   –0.676*  0.127 
Ice Cream  –0.406*  0.082 
Yogurt Cooking  –0.327  0.182 
Yogurt Flavored  –0.151*  0.071 
 
Note: An asterisk denotes that we can reject the null hypothesis that the elasticity is zero at the 
5% significance level.  
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Table 5. Percent Change in Quantity Given Fresh Milk and Processed Product Prices 
Change by Various Percentages (at the Means of the Explanatory Variables). 
 
Dairy Product  Percent Change  Percent Change  Percent Change 
  Price Quantity Price Quantity Price    Quantity 
1% Milk  –20 32.9  –20  32.7 –15.5  25.0 
2 % Milk  –20 12.2  –20  12.9 –15.5  9.5 
Nonfat Milk  –20 8.8  –20  9.6 –15.5  7.4 
Whole Milk  –20 9.2  –20  6.8 –15.5  6.8 
Fresh Cream  0 1.3 +5 2.1  1.25  0.8 
Coffee Additives  0 2.2 +5 0.6  1.25  1.1 
Natural Cheese  0 0.6 +5 –0.9  0.5  0.2 
Processed Cheese  0 1.1 +5 –0.3  0.5  0.5 
Shredded Cheese  0 1.0 +5 –0.3  0.5  0.5 
Cream Cheese  0 0.3 +5 –3.8  0.5  –1.1 
Butter  0 –1.4 +5 –1.8  –3.0  –0.3 
Ice Cream  0 1.0 +5 1.2  –1.0  1.9 
Yogurt Cooking  0 –2.4 +5 –5.3  1.25  –4.2 
Yogurt Flavored  0 –0.1 +5 –2.7  1.25  –1.0 
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Table 6. Equivalent Variation ($/week) for Demographic Group of Households that Con-














prices increase 5% 
Milk, processed 
product prices 
change the average 
of the literature 
Mean 1.44  0.63  2.94 
White 1.50  0.68  2.96 
Non–white 0.96  0.23  2.10 
Income=$10,000 1.73  0.80  3.84 
Income=$30,000 1.33  0.56  2.63 
Income=$50,000 0.94  0.33  1.41 
Income=$70,000 0.54  0.09  0.20 
Income=$90,000 0.15  –0.14 –0.92 
Education=10 Years  1.19  0.47  1.95 
Education=16 Years  1.41  0.53  3.62 
Young Child (0–5.9)  1.68  0.76  3.88 
Middle Child (6–11.9)  0.84  0.17  1.65 
Older Child (12–18)  2.00  1.13  2.57 
No Children  1.69  0.84  2.83 
Family with 3 Children
a  1.25 0.70 5.77 
Childless Couple
b  0.22 –0.37 3.34 
 
a Heads of household are 35 years old, they have a real income of $20,000, the wife is not employed, the husband 
works in a non–professional occupation, they have three children under 6 years of age, and they rent their dwelling.  
b Heads of household are 30 years old, they have a real income of $60,000, both are working professionals, and they 
own their dwelling.  
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Figure 1. Federal Milk Marketing Order Minimum Prices, 1997-1999.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Regulatory Burden for Federal Milk Marketing Orders.
 
 